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Abstract
We evaluate four computational models of ex-
planation in Bayesian networks by compar-
ing model predictions to human judgments.
In two experiments, we present human par-
ticipants with causal structures for which the
models make divergent predictions and either
solicit the best explanation for an observed
event (Experiment 1) or have participants
rate provided explanations for an observed
event (Experiment 2). Across two versions of
two causal structures and across both exper-
iments, we find that the Causal Explanation
Tree and Most Relevant Explanation mod-
els provide better fits to human data than
either Most Probable Explanation or Expla-
nation Tree models. We identify strengths
and shortcomings of these models and what
they can reveal about human explanation.
We conclude by suggesting the value of pur-
suing computational and psychological inves-
tigations of explanation in parallel.
1 Introduction
Representing statistical dependencies and causal re-
lationships is important for supporting intelligent
decision-making and action – be it executed by hu-
man or machine. Causal knowledge not only allows
predictions about what will happen, but is also used
in explanations for events that have already occurred.
For example, a set of symptoms might be explained by
appeal to a particular disease, or an electrical circuit
failure by appeal to a set of faulty gates.
Previous work in machine learning has provided a
range of models for what counts as an explanation in
cases involving a known causal system and observed
effects.These models differ in what they allow as po-
tential explanations or ‘hypotheses’ as well as in the
objective function they aim to maximize (for a review,
see Lacave and Dı´ez [2002]). For example, one ap-
proach says hypotheses are settings for all unknown
variables where you then choose the hypothesis that
maximizes a posteriori probability given observed data
[Pearl, 1988]; another allows hypotheses to be any non-
empty variable setting and selects the hypothesis that
maximizes the probability of observations under that
hypothesis relative to every other hypothesis [Yuan
and Lu, 2007]. While these models differ in their for-
mal properties, arguments for one model over another
typically come down to which provides a better fit to
researchers’ intuitions about the best explanations in
a given case.
In this paper we evaluate four formal models of expla-
nation by empirically investigating their fit to human
judgments. Our aims are threefold. First, methods
from cognitive psychology allow us to test how well
competing models correspond to general human in-
tuitions, rather than the intuitions of a small group
of researchers. Second, by using human judgment as
a constraint on formal models of explanation, we in-
crease the odds of choosing an objective function with
interesting properties for learning and inference. A
growing literature in psychology and cognitive science
suggests that generating and evaluating explanations
plays a key role in learning and inference for both chil-
dren and adults (for a review, see Lombrozo [2012]),
so effectively mimicking these effects of explanation in
formal systems is a promising step towards closing the
gap between human and machine performance on chal-
lenging inductive problems. Finally, formal models
of explanation that successfully correspond to human
judgment can contribute to the psychological study
of explanation, as almost no formal models of expla-
nation generation or evaluation have been proposed
within the psychological sciences.
We present two experiments in which we gave peo-
ple information about a causal system and had them
either generate explanations (Experiment 1) or eval-
uate explanations (Experiment 2). The causal sys-
tems can be formally defined by Bayesian networks
and correspond to those used in prior work to differ-
entiate among models of explanation [Nielsen et al.,
2008, Yuan and Lu, 2007]. Across two versions of two
causal structures and across both experiments, we find
that the Causal Explanation Tree [Nielsen et al., 2008]
and Most Relevant Explanation [Yuan and Lu, 2007]
models provide better fits to human data than either
Most Probable Explanation [Pearl, 1988] or Explana-
tion Tree models [Flores et al., 2005]. The results of
our experiments identify strengths and shortcomings
of these models, ultimately suggesting that human ex-
planation is poorly characterized by models that em-
phasize only maximizing posterior probability.
2 Bayesian networks
A Bayesian network provides a compact representation
for the joint probability of a set of random variables,
X , which explicitly represents various conditional in-
dependence statements between variables in X . We
specify a directed acyclic graph with a node corre-
sponding to each variable in X . We say that each
node X ∈ X has a set of “parent nodes” (Pa(X)), and
that this gives us conditional probability distributions
for every X given its parents p(X|Pa(X)). We assume
that the full joint probability distribution can be spec-
ified this way, i.e., that p(X ) = ∏X∈X p(X|Pa(X)).
This is equivalent to assuming that X is independent
of all nondescendent variables given its parents, and
allows us to use the structure of the graph to read
off which conditional independence relations must hold
between the variables [Pearl, 1988].
Figure 1 shows an example of a Bayesian network spec-
ifying conditional probability distributions between
random variables. The graph on the left (Pearl, named
after Pearl [1988]) represents whether a particular
alien has a disease (D), whether that alien has a ge-
netic risk factor for that disease (G), and whether or
not the alien was vaccinated for the disease (V ). The
graph on the right (Circuit) can be interpreted as a
circuit that always receives input and for which we
can measure the output. A,B,C, and D are gates
that, if functional, break the circuit, stopping the in-
put from reaching the output. Each gate has an in-
dependent probability of failing and allowing current
to cross through it. If the current can travel from the
input to the output via any path made possible by a
set of failed gates, then there will be output. These
two examples hint at the richness of the Bayesian net-
work formalism. We will continue to refer to these
graphs throughout, which are the basis for our stim-
uli in Experiments 1 and 2, with the parameter values
indicated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The Pearl and Circuit networks used in our
experiments; as in Pearl [1988], Nielsen et al. [2008],
Yuan and Lu [2007] and Yuan et al. [2011].
2.1 Explanations in Bayesian networks
Suppose we observe the values for k of the variables in
a graph, {O1 = o1, . . . , Ok = ok},∀i Oi ∈ X . We may
not wish to explain every observation, so let us call the
variables we want to explain Oexp, with values oexp.
These values oexp are the “target” of our explanation,
or the explanandum, which is a subset of O, the set of
possible observation sets. We will refer to Oˆ as the set
of variables that were observed and oˆ as the observed
values. Then Onot-exp = onot-exp are those variables
that are observed and unexplained (or Onot-exp ≡ Oˆ \
Oexp).
A candidate explanation (the explanans, or “hypoth-
esis”) is a set of variable assignments for some of the
variables not in Oexp. We exclude Oexp to avoid circu-
larity, though elements in Oˆ = oˆ but not in Oexp(i.e.,
observed but unexplained variables) could be included.
However, we should note that most models require
that every observed variable be explained; formally
Oˆ ≡ Oexp. For the sake of clarity, a hypothesis (our
term for potential explanans henceforth) will be repre-
sented by h, the variables assigned in that hypothesis
by H, and the set of hypotheses (treating each set of
assignments as a separate hypothesis) as H.
The first question a formal account of explanation
must answer is which variables should be used in con-
structing H. One possibility is for every explanation
to include an assignment for every unobserved vari-
able. However, Bayesian networks often use variables
not meant to correspond to real entities in the world
(e.g., a noisy-or gate for combining the influence of two
causes). Additionally, there are often many variables
that are not invoked in an explanation, and so a notion
of “relevance” can be useful, allowing assignments to
a subset of the unobserved variables (or even variables
that are observed but not in Oexp).
Some models first generate H and then evaluate each
hypothesis and rank them accordingly. Others “grow”
their hypotheses by iteratively adding variables based
on their ability to improve the explanation, stopping
when the hypothesis cannot be improved further [Flo-
res et al., 2005, Nielsen et al., 2008]. The hypotheses
under consideration can then be evaluated and ranked,
but note that what counts as an improved hypothesis
and what counts as a better explanation can be based
on different criteria even within the same model. Some
models aim to maximize the probability of the hypoth-
esis given the observations (p(h|oˆ)) [Pearl, 1988, Shi-
mony, 1991]. Some models are more concerned with
other metrics, such as the relative likelihood of the
observations under one hypothesis (p(oˆ|h)) compared
to the rest of the hypothesis set [Yuan and Lu, 2007,
Yuan et al., 2011]. And some models aim to maximize
how much information is gained about the explanan-
dum were the hypothesis assumed or made to be true
[Flores et al., 2005, Nielsen et al., 2008].
We now introduce the four models that we consider in
this paper — Most Probable Explanation [Pearl, 1988],
Most Relevant Explanation [Yuan and Lu, 2007], Ex-
planation Trees [Flores et al., 2005], and Causal Ex-
planation Trees [Nielsen et al., 2008].
2.2 Most Probable Explanation (MPE)
Most Probable Explanation (MPE) ranks highly hy-
potheses with the most probable assignments to all
unobserved variables, conditioning on Oˆ. That is, ev-
ery h in H includes an assignment for every variable
in X \ Oˆ.1 This model leverages the intuition that the
best explanation is one that is most probable given
what we have observed [Pearl, 1988]. The result is
MPE = arg max
h∈H
p(h|oˆ). (1)
2.3 Most Relevant Explanation (MRE)
Rather than choosing the hypothesis that maximizes
the probability of the unobserved variables given the
observed values, we could choose values for the un-
observed variables to maximize the probability of the
observations (arg maxh∈H p(oˆ|h)). Methods that pur-
sue this route are known as likelihood models.
One problem faced by likelihood models is that multi-
ple hypotheses will sometimes give the same high prob-
abilities to the observed data [Nielsen et al., 2008]. For
1We might allow h ∈ H to include only those variables
that are relevant for explaining Oˆ. This is known instead
as the maximum a posteriori model. There are a variety of
possible relevance criteria as explored by De Campos et al.
[2001], but this problem is substantially more computa-
tionally complex than MPE. Here, we focus on MPE.
example, consider the case where we know the struc-
ture of a causal system like the circuit in Figure 1 from
Yuan and Lu [2007]. Likelihood methods would treat
any hypothesis containing a union of A, “B and C”, or
“B andD” as equally good — the current flows equally
well (perfectly), regardless of the particular path it
takes. This can make it difficult to choose between
these explanations within the likelihood framework.
Rather than maximizing the likelihood per se, we can
instead choose the hypothesis, h, that has the highest
likelihood relative to the summed likelihood of all the
other hypotheses in H except for h:
p(O|h)∑
hj 6=h,hj∈H p(O|hj)
. (2)
Yuan and colleagues’ Most Relevant Explanation
(MRE) model [Yuan and Lu, 2007, Yuan et al., 2011]
proposes that the best explanation maximizes this
quantity. This term plays an important role in statis-
tics, known as the Generalized Bayes Factor [Fitelson,
2007], and in psychology, as a measure of how repre-
sentative some data is of a hypothesis [Tenenbaum and
Griffiths, 2001, Abbott et al., 2012].
2.4 Tree-based models: ET and CET
The methods we have explored so far presume that
you have H and then evaluate each hypothesis to de-
termine which is best. However, in cases where the
variable set is large, this can be difficult and compu-
tationally prohibitive. A class of tree-based models
addresses this problem by using an iterative process
for arriving at explanations. These models construct
an explanation piece-wise, adding variables to the hy-
pothesis one at a time, by choosing the best variable,
assigning the variable a value and repeating until no
further gains can be made. The resulting hypotheses
are then evaluated based on some criteria, producing a
list of explanations ranked by their goodness. Models
differ in how they choose the best variable to add, how
they decide to stop, and how they then evaluate the
resulting hypotheses.
The Explanation Tree (ET) model — as proposed by
Flores et al. [2005] — determines which variable car-
ries the most information about the rest of the un-
known nodes, conditioned on what is already known.
In ET what is already known includes Oˆ and any vari-
ables included in hypotheses farther up the tree. This
means that at the beginning (when the hypothesis is
∅) the model selects the node that provides the most
information about the rest of the unobserved variables
conditioned on Oˆ. Formally, we grow h′ (the hypoth-
esis up to that point) by choosing the Xi as the max-
imum of
∑
Y INF(Xi;Y |Oˆ, h′), where Y is shorthand
for X \ {Oˆ ∪ h′ ∪ {Xi}, or all of the variables not ob-
served, included in the current hypothesis or currently
under consideration, and INF(·) is a metric of infor-
mativeness. In our calculations we will use mutual
information as our INF(·), as in Nielsen et al. [2008].2
Once a variable is chosen, each assignment creates a
new branch, and that assignment is added to the in-
terim hypothesis h′, and is effectively treated as an
observed variable. The process is then repeated until
adding any more variables is deemed to provide a hy-
pothesis with a probability that is too low, as defined
by parameter βET , or to carry too little information, as
defined by parameter αET. This process provides mul-
tiple, mutually exclusive explanations that can vary in
their complexity based on how much information the
complexity buys.3 Once these hypotheses are assem-
bled, the model ranks the explanations by the poste-
rior probability of each branch of the tree – i.e., how
likely each hypothesis is, given the observed data.
Up to this point every model we have considered as-
sumes the set of observed data is the data we are ex-
plaining, or Oˆ ≡ Oexp. The ET model further assumes
that we aim to reduce uncertainty of the entire vari-
able set X in deciding which variables are ostensibly
relevant to our explanandum, Oexp. However, these
assumptions can be problematic. For example, in ET,
a variable that is unrelated to Oexp but carries a lot
of information about other unknown variables may be
added to the hypothesis despite its irrelevance to our
explanans.
The Causal Explanatory Tree (CET) model intro-
duced by Nielsen et al. [2008] addresses these weak-
nesses. Rather than using traditional measures of
information such as mutual information, CET uses
causal information flow [Ay and Polani, 2008] to de-
cide how the tree will grow. Causal information flow
uses the post-intervention distribution on nodes (as
proposed in Pearl [2000]) rather than considering the
joint probability distribution “as is”. To extend Ay
and Polani [2008]’s analogy, imagine pouring red dye
into a flowing river. You could identify which way is
downstream by tracking the red streak that results; if
you were to pour in the dye just after a fork in the
river, you would not find red dye in the other half of
the fork. Now consider the case of a static, dammed
river — a river that does not flow. If you poured the
dye just after the fork, redness would gradually dif-
fuse through the water, eventually reaching the other
path from the fork and tinting the whole river. In this
case, there is no concept of something being ‘down-
stream’. Causal information attempts to capture the
2Flores et al. [2005] consider several versions of INF.
3Mutual exclusivity refers to the fact that once a vari-
able is assigned, it holds through the rest of the tree.
notion of ‘downstream’ influence that is absent in tra-
ditional mutual information.
We denote post-intervention distributions with a “ ¯ ”
on a conditioned variable. If we have variables
W,X, Y, Z, where we have observed W = w, inter-
vened on Z (giving us post-intervention values Z¯ = z¯),
then the causal information passed from X to Y is,∑
x∈X
p(X = x|W = w, Z¯ = z¯) ×
∑
y∈Y
p(Y = y|X¯ = x¯, w, z¯) log p(y|x¯, w, z¯)
p(y|w, z¯) . (3)
This allows us to specifically ask the degree to which
a variable (X ≡ Xi) influences the explained data
(Y ≡ Oexp), treating the non-explained data as ob-
served (W ≡ Onot-exp) and previous parts of the ex-
planation as intervened on (Z ≡ h′). This solves
the problem of distinguishing between explained and
unexplained observations (W 6= Y ). It also allows
us to maximize information about the Oexp rather
than X \ Oˆ as in ET. However, like ET, the CET
model proposes variables iteratively, until no remain-
ing variables add more causal information than the cri-
terion αCET. Then each branch is assigned the score
log
(p(Oexp|h¯′,Onot-exp)
p(Oexp|Onot-exp)
)
where h¯′ is the total set of as-
signed values in a hypothesis at a branching point.
3 Comparing model and human
judgments about explanations
We now compare the prediction of these four mod-
els against human judgments when both generating
and evaluating explanations. We focus on explana-
tions in the two Bayesian networks shown in Figure
1. The Pearl structure is derived and parameterized
as in Nielsen et al. [2008]; the Circuit graph and its
parameters are taken from Yuan and Lu [2007]. These
networks have been used previously to distinguish be-
tween the performance of different models. Each net-
work consists of several binary variables, prior prob-
abilities on those variables, and relationships between
variables. We consider the case where only one vari-
able is observed, in Pearl D = 1 and in Circuit O = 1,
and these act as both Oˆ and Oexp, i.e., each is the only
variable we observe and explain in that structure.
The models diverge in how they rank explanations in
Pearl and Circuit. In past research, the Pearl struc-
ture was used by Nielsen et al. [2008] to argue in favor
of the CET, and the Circuit structure was used by
Yuan and Lu [2007] to argue in favor of the MRE.4
4The CET had not been published by the writing of
Yuan and Lu [2007]. Yuan et al. [2011] addresses CET
By drawing from distinct research lines we aim to be
as fair as possible in testing the models.
In addition to being useful for distinguishing be-
tween models, these structures have properties that
are particularly interesting from a psychological per-
spective. The Pearl structure includes complex causal
dependencies that cannot be easily captured by the
paradigms used in cognitive psychology. The Circuit
structure contains explanations with equal (perfect)
likelihoods for the observation, but which vary in the
number of variables cited in the explanation. Research
on people’s preferences for simplicity bear on this case,
which shows that people may choose an explanation
with fewer causes even if it is less likely than other
more complex alternatives [Lombrozo, 2007].
In the past, researchers used the match between their
own explanatory intuitions and the models’ predic-
tions to provide support for their model. However,
this method can be problematic: Nielsen et al. [2008]
and Yuan and Lu [2007] conflict in their intuitions,
leaving us in a quandary. We generalize the intuition-
matching approach using two experiments in which we
ask people to generate (Experiment 1) and evaluate
(Experiment 2) explanations in cases formally equiv-
alent to Circuit and Pearl. We used MPE, MRE,
ET, and CET to rank the quality of various expla-
nations, and analyze these rankings as they compare
to the rankings derived from human explanations. By
appealing to a wider array of human judgments we
hope to extricate ourselves from this quandary.
4 Experiment 1: Generation
4.1 Participants
We recruited 188 participants through Amazon Me-
chanical Turk; 9.6% of those failed to complete the
study, did not consent to taking the study, or did
not follow the instructions, and 35.9% failed at least
one explicit reading/attention check. This left 109
participants for analysis (M(age) = 27.7, %-Female
= 29.3%).
4.2 Materials & procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either the
Pearl or Circuit structure. They then were assigned
to one of two semantically-enriched stories embodying
a causal structure, involving either novel alien diseases
or the ecology of lakes. For example, one of the two
scenarios adapted from the Circuit structure taught
participants about the effects of novel diseases on pro-
but that work involves more complicated scenarios than
those considered here.
ducing a kind of fever.
For this scenario, participants received facts about
the base rates of four novel diseases (corresponding to
p(A), p(B), p(C), and p(D)), and information allow-
ing them to understand which diseases would produce
the fever, which would only occur in the presence of
two proteins X and Y. One disease (corresponding to
A) produced both the necessary proteins and thereby
caused the fever. The second disease (corresponding
to B) produced one of these proteins, and when paired
with either the third and/or the fourth diseases (i.e.,
C or D) which produced the other protein, would be
sufficient to cause the fever. X and Y were added to
provide an intuitive mechanism outside of the domain
of circuits that describes the complexities of Circuit ’s
causal relations. Probabilities were presented as fre-
quencies (out of 1000) and act as realizations of the
probabilities in the graphs in Figure 1.
In order to ensure that participants were paying at-
tention, we asked questions that required simply read-
ing the information off a figure (e.g., “Out of 1000,
how many aliens have [disease A]?”). Participants
who failed any comprehension questions were excluded
from subsequent analyses. To ensure that partici-
pants’ judgments were not limited by memory, the
base rates and causal structure were available when
answering these reading checks as well as during the
generation portion of the experiment. Participants
were asked to use the information that had been pro-
vided to write down “the SINGLE BEST EXPLA-
NATION” for the observed effect (e.g., for a partic-
ular alien’s fever), where “a ‘single’ explanation can
include more than one causal factor.” Participants
were explicitly asked not to list multiple possible ex-
planations, but rather to “identify the one explana-
tion that you think is the best.” This was meant to
exclude what we call “disjunctive” explanations like
“It was A or B and C and not D”, or, formally, as
A = 1 ∪ {B = 1 ∩ C = 1 ∩D = 0}.
4.3 Results and discussion
Participants’ explanations were coded by an assistant
blind to the authors’ hypotheses. The coder’s goal was
to identify which variables were mentioned and what
values were assigned to those variables. We excluded
participants who gave a response that conflicted with
our instructions, such as providing a disjunctive expla-
nation.
In Circuit, most participants provided explanations
that fell into one of two options: BC (43%) or A
(40%), and, in Pearl, most participants chose one op-
tion: they attributed the disease to the presence of a
genetic risk factor and not receiving the vaccine (73%,
see Figure 1).
For the explanations participants generated, we com-
puted measures of explanation quality under each of
the four models and saw which models gave bet-
ter scores to those explanations that were generated
more frequently. This process provides us a rank for
each participant’s explanation according to each of the
models and a rank of how frequently each explanation
was generated, which allows us to calculate a Spear-
man rank-order correlation between participant’s ag-
gregate explanation choices and the models’ predic-
tions, see Table 1.
Note, we used two versions of the tree-algorithms: one
where explanations not reached by the tree received
the lowest possible rank (which we give the subscript
“tree”), and one where we ignored these exclusions and
applied the evaluation criteria used at each branch
point. The tree models were designed to both gen-
erate and evaluate explanations “on the fly”, but it
is not clear whether the way models generate expla-
nations has led to their success in previous literature.
Model success (or failure) may be the result of the
branch evaluation criterion, rather than the result of
the algorithm for generating hypotheses. This is why
we analyze these parts of the algorithms separately.
We find that MRE and CET are most consistent with
participants’ judgments (though they still only reach
marginal significance in the Circuit case). In contrast,
for both structures, models that rely only on an assign-
ment’s probability (i.e., MPE and ET) poorly pre-
dict the explanations that people generate (in Circuit,
MPE had a negative coefficient).
The major weakness of the tree versions of CET and
ET lies in the fact that once a node is chosen for ex-
pansion, it remains expanded. Thus, mutually exclu-
sive explanations cannot be reached in the same tree.
That is, in Circuit, A and BC were the two most pop-
ular explanations and A ∩ BC = ∅, so the first step
to include either A or B will preclude the other ex-
Table 1: Rank-correlations for models and human data
in Experiment 1, Pval < 0.05 in bold, < 0.10 in italics.
Circuit Pearl
Models ρSpearman Pval ρSpearman Pval
MPE -0.06 0.631 0.32 0.449
MRE 0.20 0.074 0.83 0.017
ET 0.08 0.460 0.17 0.700
ETtree 0.01 0.900 0.41 0.310
CET 0.22 0.055 0.93 0.003
CETtree 0.06 0.590 0.77 0.032
planation. Empirically, participants are roughly split
between these two explanations, which suggests that
any method that generates a unique best explanation
will always fail to capture the variability that results
when people are generating explanations, even if those
people are generating explanations about the same sys-
tem. We studied only deterministic algorithms which
may be causing the models to diverge from people in
how they generate hypotheses. Adding probabilistic
rules may also be important for accounting for uncer-
tainty about the parameter estimates, which in the
real world are typically not given to you but must be
inferred from data as well.
Note that CET in this case treats all explanations
that sufficiently determine the observations as having
equivalent rank. Because the system is determinis-
tic, all 38 of the sufficient explanations are ranked as
number 1 — or rather, because they are so numer-
ous, number 19. This is a problem unique to CET,
and results from its use of intervention, which ignores
variables’ prior distributions in determining an expla-
nation’s score.
5 Experiment 2: Evaluation
In Experiment 1, we found evidence that at least some
of the proposed models capture people’s explanatory
intuitions. Of course we should have expected some
of the models to perform well; what is remarkable is
how poorly some of the models did. In particular,
we saw surprisingly poor performance from the tree-
growth models as compared to their exhaustive-search
evaluative counterparts.
Generating explanation is harder than only evaluat-
ing them — generation requires searching through the
hypothesis set and then evaluating the generated ex-
planations, while evaluation only requires computing
a known evaluation function. The tree versions of the
tree models are designed to make generation tractable.
However, if complexity were the primary hurdle, in
Circuit where the hypothesis space was much larger,
we would expect tree methods to perform compara-
tively better than in Pearl. But they were relatively
worse. This was due to the fact that the tree models
were guaranteed to cut off at least 40% of participants
since A and BC were the top choices, and cannot be
reached in the same tree.
It is striking that methods that relied on probability
(MPE and ET) performed so poorly in contrast to
MRE and CET. However, these results may only ap-
ply to situations in which explanations are generated;
explanations with large absolute probabilities may be
difficult to access when generating explanations but
could still be preferred if people only need to evaluate
predefined hypotheses. There are many cases in which
a hypothesis proves incredibly hard to generate, but
once generated quickly becomes welcomed as the best
explanation for many phenomena (e.g., Newton’s and
Einstein’s physics). And, if conquering search prob-
lem is one of the driving factors behind the success of
MRE and CET, it is possible that they could fail in
the evaluation case.
In order to test these ideas, we conduct an experiment
that is almost identical to Experiment 1. But, rather
than asking people to generate explanations, we take
that burden off of their shoulders. Instead, we ask
them to evaluate a set of explanations that we generate
for them.
5.1 Participants
A total of 245 participants were recruited through
Amazon Mechanical Turk, with 9.8% excluded for
failing to provide consent or otherwise complete the
study and 25.3% excluded for failing one or more read-
ing checks. This left 165 participants for analysis
(M(age) = 31.3,%-Female = 34%): 46 in the disease
version of Circuit, 46 in the lake version of Circuit,
34 in the disease version of Pearl, and 39 in the lake
version of Pearl.
5.2 Stimuli
An explanation was included in the study if either cri-
terion held:
• The explanation was generated by more than one
participant in any one condition in Experiment 1.
• The explanation was in the top two explanations
generated by any of the models.5
This yielded thirteen explanations for the Circuit
causal structure and six for the Pearl causal structure.
5.3 Procedure
The materials and methods were nearly identical to
those in Experiment 1, with the following important
change: instead of providing an explanation, partici-
pants were asked to rate the quality of several provided
5Because there are many ways one can interpret what
counts as one of the two “top” explanations, we allowed
the top two as defined by any interpretation found in the
literature of how to rank a model’s results. For example,
Yuan [2009] and Yuan et al. [2011] include only minimal
explanations (i.e., explanations for which no subset has
appeared prior to it in the ranking of explanations) when
determining the results of MRE, whereas Nielsen et al.
[2008] simply listed explanations based on their scores re-
gardless of their minimal or non-minimal status.
explanations. Specifically, they were asked to rate each
explanation “by placing the slider next to each expla-
nation along the spectrum from Very Bad Explanation
(furthest to the left) to Very Good Explanation (fur-
thest to the right),” where intermediate ratings could
fall anywhere in between.
Although the sliders were not presented with a num-
bering, positions implicitly corresponded to values be-
tween 0 and 100. Based on these ratings we can again
create an explanation ranking for each participant,
with ties being treated as in Experiment 1 as a re-
peated average value. By using ranks rather than con-
tinuous ratings we need only assume that participants
have a monotonic relationship between bad and good,
and avoid making assumptions about the particular
nature of that scale for each participant.
5.4 Assessing model predictions
For each model, we calculated the scores assigned to
the explanations that were provided to human par-
ticipants. Because we were interested in explanation
evaluation, we did not limit the ranks derived from
CET or ET to those generated by the trees, but we
did limit MPE to complete assignments, as otherwise
it would be equivalent to ET.
To generate scores indicating the quality of each
model, we created a set of intersection proportions.
To illustrate, were we to consider only a single par-
ticipant, this involves the following process. We take
the human ranking as the veridical ranking. We then
check whether the model’s top rank explanation is the
same as the participant’s. We then check whether the
model’s two highest-ranked explanations are included
in either of the two highest-ranked human explana-
tions. We continue to do this for the whole explanation
set, identifying the number of model explanations that
were ranked at a level less than or equal to each level of
human ranking. We can repeat this with every partic-
ipant, to obtain the number of explanations matched
at each rank for each participant. We can then take
the average of these scores at each rank, giving us the
intersection size for the full population.
It is important to note that the absolute intersection
size is less useful than the proportion when we are com-
paring between causal structures. We can transform
these values into intersection proportions by dividing
each value by the total number of model explanations.
This maps to a measure of how many of the model’s
top explanations are thought by the models to be at
least as good as those generated by the average person
up to that point.
To illustrate, suppose that we had explanation set
H : A, BC, BD, ABCD, and B, and we were con-
Figure 2: Results for Experiment 2: Average intersec-
tion proportions for Circuit conditions.
sidering a participant(P ) with a ranking of P (1) =
BC, P (2) = A, P (3) = ABCD, P (4) = BD, and
P (5) = B. To compute a model’s performance,
we would look at the ranking that the model(M)
assigned to the different explanations. If their top
ranks matched, i.e., M(1) = BC was the model’s top
choice, then the first value would be V (M,P, 1) = 15 =
|M(1)={BC}∩P (1)={BC}|
|H| , and if it was not the score
would be 0 since M(1) ∩ P (1) = ∅. This process
would be repeated for the first and second values, i.e.,
the next value is V (M,P, 2) = |{M(1)M(2)}∩{P (1)P (2)}||H| ,
and so on until we got to V (M,P, 5) which will neces-
sarily equal 1 since both rankings were defined relative
to the same set, meaning the two sets are equivalent
and are also both equivalent to H.
Figure 2 displays the intersection proportion for the
Circuit structure, and Figure 3 displays those for the
Pearl structure.
Another method for capturing overall model perfor-
mance is to take the sum of the average values at each
point. The best one can do in the intersection propor-
tion is to match every explanation up to that rank at
each rank. A perfect summary score is,
∑|H|
i=1 i/|H|.
For Circuit the maximum summed intersection value
is
∑13
i=1 i/13 = 7 and for Pearl it is
∑6
i=1 i/6 = 3.5.
6
These values can be found in Table 2.
5.5 Results and discussion
As you can see in Figures 2 and 3, both MRE and
CET are closer to the dotted line in general, i.e., they
are better on average than either MPE or ET.
One interesting pattern to note is a trend that echoes
results for CET in Experiment 1. CET stays flat
6One could think of this as an estimate of the area under
the curve defined by the intersection proportions.
Figure 3: Results for Experiment 2: Average intersec-
tion proportions for Pearl conditions.at zero for a while and then rapidly accelerates as it
goes forward. This is a consequence of the interac-
tion between CET’s reliance on intervention and the
deterministic causal system in the Circuit condition.
Because so many of the explanations are sufficient for
bringing about the effect in question, many explana-
tions share the role of the ’best’ explanation. And
because we choose an explanation’s rank in the case of
a tie as the average rank of all those in the tie had they
not been in a tie, many of the best explanations are
given a fairly high value. Thus, once we get to the sixth
item, M(1)-M(5) have had equal scores to M(6), and
once the values pass that threshold CET’s V (M,P, ·)
rapidly catches up to and passes MRE’s (which was
otherwise in the lead). MPE, on the other hand, has
the opposite problem: only two of its values are de-
fined and so the other eleven explanations all receive
a score of 8, resulting in perfect performance from 8
onwards (though most of its ranks are, by definition,
undefined).
Table 2 shows that in both structures CET does the
best, followed by MRE, then MPE and finally ET.
6 General discussion
We began this paper with the aim of systematically
evaluating formal models of explanation against hu-
man intuitions as well as clarifying human explana-
Table 2: Summed intersection values for models.
Models Circuit Score Pearl Score
MPE 5.26 2.64
MRE 5.43 2.96
ET 4.99 2.55
CET 5.60 3.00
Max Value: 7 3.5
tion through the lens of computational models. We
consider how our results address these aims.
6.1 Evaluating models of explanation
We find that CET and MRE provide reasonable but
imperfect fits to human judgments in both the Circuit
and Pearl structures, and for both explanation gen-
eration and evaluation. MPE and ET perform less
well. This suggests that human explanation is not ex-
plained well by appealing to maximum posterior prob-
ability values. Instead, it seems that a measure of
evidence (MRE) or causal information (CET) may
better model human explanation.
These findings indicate that the algorithms used for
generating explanations in the tree methods (ET and
CET) fail to capture an important aspect of human
intuitions about explanation — explanations that are
radically different from one another (i.e., that cannot
be reached by the same tree) may both be seen as valid
explanations. In the generation task, the purely evalu-
ative tree models outperformed their generative coun-
terparts. The evaluation function seems to be quite
important, but it has been emphasized less than the
generation algorithm in previous work [Flores et al.,
2005, Nielsen et al., 2008]. The evaluation function
merits closer inspection.
Speaking generally, our work reveals the degree to
which a model’s objective alters that model’s predic-
tions. Our analyses highlight the problem with using
hard intervention in deterministic cases. CET gave
the same score to all 38 sufficient explanations that,
presumably, we would want the model to distinguish.
MPE and ET excel at doing what they were cre-
ated to do, but we may wish to distinguish between
their goals (which do not correspond closely to human
explanation judgments) and the goals of models like
CET and MRE (which do).
6.2 Bidirectional implications from human
and formal explanation
These results indicate that formally characterizing the
objective function implicit in human explanation may
be a challenging but exceptionally useful task. The
variability in how well these formal models performed
demonstrates that despite seeming straightforward,
how people choose a good explanation has many hid-
den subtleties and complexities. The good perfor-
mance of CET and MRE relative to MPE and ET
suggest that human explanation is likely more con-
cerned with causal intervention or the relative quality
of a hypothesis than it is with absolute judgments of
posterior probability. But the alternative hypothesis
set and the role of intervention have received relatively
little attention in psychological research on explana-
tion. On the other hand, simplicity was not explicitly
represented in the formal models we explored (but, see
De Campos et al. [2001]), but has been found to af-
fect human explanatory judgments [Lombrozo, 2012].
Then, it is surprising that a large proportion of peo-
ple explain using BC over A in the Circuit example,
when BC is both less likely and more complex than
A. Probability, simplicity, intervention and alternative
hypotheses seem to weave a rather complex image —
an image just asking to be unraveled.
All of the models we studied require knowing a pri-
ori the causal structure and parameterization, whereas
people must infer these values from finite amounts of
data. Though explanation has been tied to improved
learning, we know much less about how the learning
process and the processes for generating and evaluat-
ing explanations interact with one another. Addition-
ally, developing extensions of these models that can
learn from finite amounts of data will increase the ex-
pressivity of the models while also making them more
able to deal with the problems that both humans and
many real intelligent systems face.
6.3 Conclusion
Given that explanation plays an important role in hu-
man inductive judgments [Lombrozo, 2012], where hu-
mans still outperform artificial systems, we propose
that models will benefit from a closer match to hu-
man judgments. And conversely, given that formal
models need to make explicit the roles played by dif-
ferent parts of the explanatory problem and its solu-
tion, we propose that psychological accounts of expla-
nation will benefit from models that precisely specify
formal characteristics for what makes a good expla-
nation. Both inquiries benefit from attending to the
other. Our work, in simultaneously analyzing mod-
els of explanation from artificial intelligence and the
psychology of human explanation, embodies this view.
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